Indiana Law Journal
Volume 73

Issue 1

Article 8

Winter 1997

Equality Under the Law or Annihilation of Marriage and Morals?
The Same-Sex Marriage Debate
Germaine Winnick Willett
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Contracts Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Willett, Germaine Winnick (1997) "Equality Under the Law or Annihilation of Marriage and Morals? The
Same-Sex Marriage Debate," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 73 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol73/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Equality Under the Law or Annihilation
of Marriage and Morals? The Same-Sex
Marriage Debate
GERMAINE WINNICK WILLETT*

I. INTRODUCTION

After years of failed lawsuits' and vehement law review articles,2 proponents
of same-sex marriage can finally chalk up two victories. First, in 1993, the
Hawaii Supreme Court held that denial of marriage to same-sex couples is gender
discrimination, and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.' Second, the Hawaii
trial court recently decided on remand that the ban on same-sex marriage is
unconstitutional. The court held that the state did not demonstrate a compelling
interest in denying the benefits, privileges, and responsibilities of marriage to
same-sex couples.4 The state's appeal is not expected to be heard until late 1997
or early 1998, and the trial court's order will likely be stayed until then,' but by
most accounts it is likely that the Hawaii Supreme Court will uphold the validity

* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1994,
DePauw University. I would like to thank my husband, Brian Willett, and my parents, Terri and
John Winnick, and my brother and sisters, for their unconditional love. I am especially grateful
to my husband for listening to me as I sorted out the issues this Note involves. Finally, I thank
my law school friends for their support and Professor Aviva Orenstein for her assistance.
1. See e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); Dean v. District of
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,409 U.S. 810 (1972); De Santo
v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974); see also Jonathan Deitrich, Comment, The Lessons of the Law: Same-Sex
Marriage and Baehr v. Lewin, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 121, 134-36 (1994) (discussing several of
these cases and the judicial justifications for the opinions).
2. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv.
1419 (1993); John Dwight Ingram, A ConstitutionalCritiqueof Restrictions on the Right to
Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-Or Mary and Alice at the Same Time?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. L. 33 (1984); Deborah Gray, Note, Marriage:Homosexual Couples Need Not
Apply, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 515 (1988); Arthur J. Silverstein, Comment, Constitutional
Aspects of the Homosexual's Right to a MarriageLicense, 12 J.FAM. L. 607 (1972); Note, The
Legality of HomosexualMarriage,82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
3. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). When an equal protection challenge is
made, a court will apply strictscrutiny to laws that discriminate against suspect categories. The
court will strike down the law unless the state proves that it has a compelling reason for the
classification and the law is narrowly tailored to serve the purpose for which it was passed. See
id. at 63-64.
4. See Baehr v. Miike, Civil No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
5. See Cindy Moy, Reactions Run Along PhilosophicalLines After HawaiiRecognizes
Same-Sex Marriages,WEsT's LEGAL NEws, Dec. 6, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 694924.
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of same-sex marriages. 6 Because the plaintiffs' claim was brought solely under
Hawaii's constitution, there will be no appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.7
Within a year or two, this nation may be faced with a novel situation: the
recognition in one state of marriages joining lesbians with lesbians and gay men
with gay men. And the debate has already begun as to what effect Hawaii's
decision will have on the rest of the states and the federal government.
Proponents on both sides of the issue argue in sweeping terms, one saying that
recognition will end the institution of marriage as we know it, the other claiming
that recognition will benefit the American family and, in any event, is compelled
by the Constitution. The arguments as to whether such marriages, once
recognized in Hawaii, are to be recognized in the remaining states are heated.
Interestingly, both sides claim the Full Faith and Credit Clause supports their
conclusion.
The passage into law of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") 8 has
intensified the battle. The act provides that each state is free not to recognize
same-sex marriage, and already states have introduced and passed bills denying
it.' This Note discusses, as background, the same-sex marriage debate, including
the constitutional arguments, and the validity and effect of DOMA. If gays and
lesbians win the right to marry in Hawaii, the validity of their marriages outside
of Hawaii will be at issue. In light of this, this Note will next discuss the meaning
of a valid same-sex marriage, given the Full Faith and Credit Clause and conflictof-laws doctrines, for the rest of the country. Finally, this Note will consider the
likelihood, given Indiana law and policy, that a same-sex marriage legally
celebrated in Hawaii will be recognized in the State of Indiana.

6. Because the Hawaii Constitution treats gender as a suspect classification, strict scrutiny
is applied to laws that discriminate on the basis of gender.
Because the strict scrutiny test is a demanding standard-at the United States
Supreme Court level, for example, it has been met in the context of racial
discrimination only in the case in which it was developed [i.e., Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)]-it is possible that Baehr, ultimately, will
make Hawaii the first state to marry same-sex couples.
Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage,29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 508 (1994)
(footnote omitted).
7. See Henry J. Resky, A Matter of FullFaith,A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 32, 34.
8. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I
U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997), and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997)).
9. Utah and Idaho have passed same-sex marriage bans and several other state legislatures
are considering similar measures. See Jim Christie, Same-Sex Marriages:A Legislative
Priority?,WASH. J., July 11, 1996, at 1; cf Jon Kerr, Colorado Governor Vetoes Ban on
Single-Sx Marriages,WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 29, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL

259450.
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II. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

U.S. Representative Gerry E. Studds, one of three openly gay members of
Congress, characterized the debate on same-sex marriage and the DOMA as "'the
last unfinished chapter of civil rights in this country."".. Indeed, it seems difficult
to imagine, with Loving v. Virginia" now thirty years old, that interracial
marriage was once prohibited in as many as thirty-eight states. 2 Despite the high
level of racial discrimination that African Americans faced then and continue to
face, 3 the Supreme Court spoke with such vehemence 4 that the decision has
endured without question. Conversely, gays and lesbians have not received
similar protection from the Supreme Court." For example, gays and lesbians
suffer discrimination in the public sphere' 6 except where ordinances have been
passed to prohibit it.' 7 Moreover, sexual orientation discrimination has been
overt in the military setting (the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to an
appeal by a serviceman challenging as a free-speech infringement the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy now employed by the military)' In the area of relationships

10. John E. Yang, House Votes to Curb Gay Marriages,WASH. POST,July 13, 1996, at Al
(quoting Rep. Studds). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality andthe Constitution,70 IND.
L.J. 1, 1 (1994), for the author's remark that "discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
has become one of the most important equality issues of the 1990's."
11. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's prohibition of interracial marriage
unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiffs, an interracial married couple, of equal protection
under the law and the fundamental right to marry).
12. See James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the
MiscegenationAnalogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 93, 97 (1993).
13. See, e.g., id.at 93 n.2 (citing a 1991 Gallup Poll finding that 45% of white Americans
disapprove of interracial marriage, while only 44% approve).
14. The decision in Loving was unanimous. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
15. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that homosexuals do not
have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
16. "Even today, homosexuals must often keep their orientation secret in order to be free
from discrimination and even violence. In many sectors of the economy, homosexuals cannot
easily obtain jobs if their sexual orientation is disclosed." Sunstein, supra note 10, at 8.
17. According to the L.P. Cookingham Institute of Public Affairs, 15 states have laws or
executive orders that prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, and 142
cities and counties will enforce the civil rights of gays and lesbians via ordinance, executive
order, or government policy. See Norma M. Riccucci & Charles W. Gossett, Employment
Discriminationin State and Local Government: The Lesbian and Gay Male Experience, AM.
REV. PUB. ADMIN., June 1996, at 175; see also Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of
Law Rules and the InterstateRecognition ofSame-Sex Marriages,1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 911,
936 nn. 162-63 (listing communities with domestic partnership laws, communities that have
granted benefits to employees' same-sex partners, and communities with gay rights laws).
18. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (holding that Navy Officer
Thomasson's rights to free speech were not violated though he was honorably discharged from
military duty after writing "I am gay" in a letter to his superiors), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358
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and intimacy, gays and lesbians are derided for their orientation, their practices,
and often for their very existence. Though many live in monogamous, committed,
long-term relationships, they are denied the incidents of marriage. Though bans
on miscegenation and bans on same-sex marriage cannot be equated, they are
analogous. It would be presumptuous to claim that homosexuals have suffered
equally with African Americans in this country. But while the costs of racism
have been more overt, discrimination against gays and lesbians runs deeper, a
prejudice that members of different races and ethnic groups share. 9 To be sure,
unlike overt racial characteristics, one's homosexuality can be hidden, but this
feature does not completely undermine the analogy between miscegenation
statutes and prohibition of same-sex marriage: "To individuals denied their right
of whether the denial is based on
to marry, their injury is the same, regardless
20
their race or their sexual orientation.,
A. The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage
Those who make the case against recognition of same-sex marriage argue on
many fronts. The first argument such advocates make is most often that marriage
is defined as a legal union between a man and a woman, and therefore, by
definition, two men or two women cannot be so described. 2' The highest court
in Kentucky went so far as to cite three different dictionaries' definitions of
marriage,2 2 and though Kentucky's marriage statutes did not specifically forbid
legal recognition of same-sex married partners, the court concluded that the
appellants were "prevented from marrying . . . by their own incapability of
entering into a marriage as that term is defined. 23 One commentator recently
remarked that "under the law as it stands today, homosexual marriage is an

(1996).
19. For example, a poll conducted in Louisiana showed very little difference in the results
when comparing black respondents with white respondents. Eighty-three percent of white
people polled, and 86 percent of black people polled were opposed to legalizing same-sex
marriage. Respondents Overwhelmingly Oppose Issue, BATON ROUGE ADvOC., Jan. 8, 1997,
at 1C, availablein 1997 WL 7230699.
20. Trosino, supranote 12, at 94 n.12.
21. See Kevin Aloysius Zambrowicz, Comment, "To Love andHonorAll the Days of Your
Life ": A ConstitutionalRight to Same-Sex Marriage?,43 CATH.U. L. REv. 907, 916-17 (1994)
(noting that courts deciding against recognition of same-sex marriages have used this definition
rationale); see also Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Trosino,
supra note 12, at 113.
22. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); see also Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
23. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
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oxymoron. It simply does not exist, because the legal definition of marriage 'is
that it is a union of a man and a woman."' 24
Closely analogous to the definition-of-marriage rationale is the "tradition"
argument. Opponents of same-sex marriage commonly remind us that no state in
the nation, and indeed no country in the world recognizes it. 25 U.S.
Representative Bob Barr, cosponsor of the DOMA, was quoted after the bill
passed the House as saying that:
America will not be the first country in the world that throws the concept of
marriage out the window and for the very first time in the history of
civilization says that homosexual marriages are as important as, and rise to
the level of the legal and moral equivalency of, heterosexual marriage. 26
It is true that even Hungary, which decided in May, 1996 to recognize the
validity of same-sex common law marriages,.7 has not gone that last
step--issuing state-sanctioned marriage licenses-to put same-sex unions on the
same plane as heterosexual marital relationships.
Additionally, references to custom were used by the court in Jones v.
Hallahan:"Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue
licenses for that purpose ....
In all cases, however, marriage has always been
considered as the union of a man and a woman ....
Commentator Richard F.
Duncan states that "[s]ame-sex marriage has been unanimously and consistently
rejected by the laws of every state in this country. Even when a state's marriage
statute does not expressly confine marriage to one man and one woman, the
courts have consistently held that same-sex marriages are not permitted."'2 9
The next argument put forth by defenders of the current state of marriage is
that marriage is integrally connected with procreation. Therefore, same-sex
couples, being incapable of reproduction together, cannot marry. The

24. Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal

O'Connor a "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 587, 589 (1996)
(quoting HOMER H. CLARK,

JR., THE LAW OF

DOMEsTIc RELATIONS

IN THE UNITED STATES
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(2d ed. 1988)). But cf Trosino, supra note 12, at 116 (stating that the definition rationale is
circular because it "amounts to an intellectually unsatisfactory response: marriage is the union
of a man and a woman because marriage is the union of a man and a woman").
25. See, e.g., The Defense of MarriageAct; Hearing on S.1740 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 39 n.75 (1996) [hereinafter Defense of MarriageHearing]

(prepared statement of Lynn D. Wardle) (indicating that Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
Iceland have domestic partnerships, but that neither these countries nor any other has blessed
such unions with the term "marriage").
26. Jerry Gray, House PassesBar to U.S. Sanction of Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, July 13,

1996, at 1.
27. See Deb Bridge, Everyone Entitledto Equality: Homosexuality as Normal as Being
Left-handed, CALGARY HERALD, July 4, 1996, at A10, availablein 1996 WL 5087529.

28. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the refusal of
marriage licenses to two women, holding that the two were incapable of entering into marriage
based on the definition of marriage as an opposite-sex union. See id.
29. Duncan, supra note 24, at 589.
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Washington appellate court in Singer v. Hara3' determined the denial of a
marriage license to the two male appellants was not gender discrimination but
was "based upon the state's recognition that our society as a whole views
marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing
of children."'', The court brushed off the argument that barren opposite-sex
couples and those who chose not to procreate were still granted the right to
marry, by noting that such are exceptional cases: "The fact remains that marriage
exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values
associated with the propagation of the human race. 32 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has invoked the traditional procreative function of the marital relationship
in decisions that involve the right to marry.33
In addition, judges and commentators have used religious mores and biblical
passages, as well as general public morality, to deny judicial requests for samesex marriage and otherwise argue against the concept.34 Without a doubt, the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick35 has served as support for
opponents of same-sex marriage.36 The Supreme Court in Bowers signified that
"at least in certain instances, morality can serve as a rational basis for
legislation. 37 States which outlaw all sodomy, or homosexual sodomy in
particular, between consenting adults obviously have a defined public policy that
opposes the consummation of such marriages:
"Criminalizing intimate contact between same-sex couples is not only a
prohibition of the law but also the strongest possible expression that an act

30. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).

31. Id. at 1195.
32. Id.

33. See Zambrowicz, supra note 21, at 915-16 (indicating that Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978), Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), all make reference
to procreation and child-rearing in describing marriage); see also Duncan, supra note 24, at
595 ("The institution of marriage is designed to promote and encourage procreation....
[C]onventional marriage is of critical importance to society because, as Chief Justice Warren
observed in Loving v. Virginia, it is 'fundamental to our very existence and survival."') (case
name not italicized in original) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). But cf
Deitrich, supra note 1, at 136 ("If the only valid purpose of marriage was procreation, all the
decisions concerning birth control were wrongly decided.").
34. But see Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage-WhyNot?, 4 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 461, 488
(1995) (contending that "[iut is obvious that the majority of those who quote Leviticus are
shamefully selective," for the passages surrounding the remonstrance of homosexual acts
include "slaughtering animals without making a sacrifice to God; deception ... ; making a
worker wait overnight for earned wages; cutting one's beard; tattoos") (citations omitted). See
generally D'Amato, supra note 17, at 926 (discussing the court's use of morality to bolster its
decision, in Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct.
June 2, 1992)); Zambrowicz, supra note 21, at 912 n.33.
35. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

36. See Jax, supra note 34, at 464.
37. D'Amato, supra note 17, at 926 n.96.
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violates the public policy of a state, and a court may very well use the
existence of a state sodomy law as a basis for ruling that same-sex marriages
violate a strong public policy of the state."38
A few more claims have been used by those who speak out against same-sex
marriage. These reasons for maintaining the status quo include references to
homosexuality being unnatural,39 worries that state endorsement of same-sex
marriage will legitimize homosexual orientation and cause it to spread,4 °
concerns that same-sex marriage partners raising children will confuse their
children and subject them to harassment from others,4" and belief that a
heterosexual married relationship is the best and most beneficial setting in which
to raise children.4 2 Because no court except the Hawaii Supreme Court has

subjected same-sex marriage bans to heightened scrutiny, the litany of reasons
above has served as a repertoire of rational governmental interests. Moreover,
homosexuals have not yet been found to be a suspect class for the purposes of
U.S. constitutional law,43 and courts have avoided extending the fundamental

38. Id. at 926 (quoting Interview by D'Amato of University of Illinois College of Law
Professor Harry Krause in Champaign, Ill. (Oct. 13, 1994)).
39. See Duncan, supra note 24, at 595 ("Nature has designed the human body to allow
heterosexual couples to unite biologically in a way it has denied homosexuals .... "); Trosino,
supra note 12, at 108 (commenting that opponents have used gay couples' inability to
reproduce children together in the manner of most heterosexual couples to prove their
relationships are against nature, and discounting this argument by analogizing it to "the white
supremacist's argument against interracial marriage"). "Although the white supremacist feared
the loss of white preeminence, the heterosexual supremacist fears the loss of heterosexual
dominance." Id.
40. See Trosino, supra note 12, at 110 (noting that this argument is faulty because it rests
on the assumption that homosexuality spreads through socialization, when evidence indicates
that sexual orientation is not chosen); see also Jax, supra note 34, at 470-71 (commenting that
granting homosexuals the right to marry will not increase homosexuality, nor will denial cause
it to go away). "Lifting the ban on same-sex marriage cannot enable one to change what is
biologically fated. Furthermore, history affirms that homosexuality has existed in humankind
regardless of its acceptance among the power-majority." Id. Still, scientific evidence has not
been conclusive as to what causes a person's sexual orientation, and many continue to believe
it is not biological or genetic and can even be "cured," and that the law serves a vital purpose
in educating citizens about the correct sexual norms and behavior. See Duncan, supra note 24,
at 599.
41. See Trosino, supranote 12, at 110-11; see also D'Amato, supra note 17, at 934 n.141
(indicating that studies show that children of gay parents are likely to suffer from unkind words
from their peers during early adolescence).
42. James Trosino notes the persistent myth that homosexuals are pedophiles, and remarks
that children are actually less likely to be molested by a homosexual adult than by a
heterosexual adult. Moreover, he indicates that studies show children of gay parents are no
more likely than children of heterosexual parents to become homosexual. See Trosino, supra
note 12, at 110-11.
43. See Zambrowicz, supra note 21, at 931 n.154 (noting that race, allegiance, and national
origin have all been defined as suspect classes).
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right to 44marry by defining marriage strictly as a union between a man and a
woman.

B. The Casefor Same-Sex Marriage
Proponents have argued everything from constitutional rights to simple justice
in support of the recognition of same-sex marriage. Those who partake in statesanctioned marriage must take on new responsibilities associated with marriage.
But people who marry are rewarded with a host of benefits, 4 as well as peace of
mind that the solemn commitment ideally brings. Proponents of same-sex
marriage claim that persons desiring to marry another of the same sex have been
denied their basic constitutional rights and have been deprived ofjustice.
1. Marriage Is a Fundamental Right Guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause
One justification for extending the right to marry to same-sex couples is that
the Constitution compels it. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
individuals have a fundamental right to make decisions for themselves when it
comes to physical intimacy, child-rearing, and choosing a spouse. 6 Even
prisoners, arguably the least worthy of having their individual rights protected,
have a fundamental right to get married. 47 States may restrict the right to marry
only if they have compelling reasons for doing so. The interests of public health,

44. See id at 932. Indeed, this commentator suggests that advocates of same-sex marriage
expend no energy on arguing that homosexuals as a class are being denied equal protection,
because it is not likely they will be found a suspect class (they have recently acquired some
political power, they are not necessarily visibly identifiable like members of a particular race
or alienage, and there is a question that their homosexuality is an immutable characteristic). See
id at 940-43. He believes that other avenues, such as sex discrimination arguments, are more
likely to succeed. See id. at 936; cf Jax, supra note 34, at 474-76 (arguing that homosexuality
is an immutable trait, highlighting evidence that homosexuality is biological or genetic, and
citing to a psychologist who noted that "treatments" such as "castration in gays, hysterectomies
in lesbians, lobotomies, and shock therapy could not change homosexuals into heterosexuals").
45. See Deitrich, supra note 1, at 122 (listing favorable tax treatment, intestate succession,
employer health coverage, social security entitlements, spousal communication rights, and
hospital and jail visitation rights as state-granted benefits of marriage).
46. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
47. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97-100 (1987) (holding that prohibition of marriages
of inmates to other inmates or civilians except in so-called "compelling" circumstances
(generally, pregnancy) was invalid on its face because the regulation was not reasonably related
to the asserted state interests, and reasoning that while the state could reasonably restrict the
time and place of inmates' marriages, this statute amounted to an almost complete ban).
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the protection of children, and the prevention of incest, bigamy, and polygamy
have been found to be sufficiently compelling to justify marriage restrictions.48
a. What Are Fundamental Rights?
In Bowers v. Hardwick,49 the Court held that homosexual sodomy, because it
is not traditionally ingrained in American culture, was not a fundamental right
with which the government may not interfere: the majority described
"fundamental rights" as "those liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."'5 0 The Court conveniently did not factor into the analysis
its decisions in which rights to abortion and the use of contraception were held
fundamental, despite the fact that governments had traditionally proscribed
these.5 ' Even more telling is that interracial marriage was also traditionally
proscribed, 2 yet the Court brought it under the umbrella of substantive due
process.5 3
It is incorrect to define fundamental rights solely in connection with a
conception of this country's, or Anglo-American, history and tradition. In all
truth, recognition of fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
has been the result of balancing personal liberty against the interests of the public
as a whole. As Justice O'Connor admitted in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 4
"the inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may
call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity
which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its
boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule.""5 Justice

48. See Barbara J.Cox, Same-Sex Marriageand Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii,
Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. Rnv. 1033, 1048 (noting that
restricting marriage because a party has venereal disease is a public health concern, that age
restrictions are in the best interests of children, and that consanguinity restrictions prevent
incest); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (rejecting Reynolds's
claim that outlawing polygamy violated his rights to free exercise of the Mormon faith and
finding that polygamy contravened the state interest in monogamy, and "fetter[ed] the people
in stationary despotism").
49. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
50. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
51. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The SecondDeath of Substantive Due Process,62 IND. L.J. 215,
216 (1987) ("Deviating sharply from the Court's own precedents, Bowers necessarily works
to undercut the theoretical underpinnings of the modem Court's substantive due process
doctrine.").
52. See supranote 12 and accompanying text.
53. Professor Barbara J. Cox states that "what has been protected under United States
Supreme Court due process and right-to-privacy precedent is not any particular practice or act,
but instead the decision to take certain actions." Cox, supranote 48, at 1057 (emphasis added).
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. Id. at 849.
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O'Connor continued, saying "[olur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code." 56
Accordingly, commentator Christine Jax asserts that not only has the Supreme
Court recognized a fundamental right to marry, but its other relevant fundamental
rights cases have centered around the individual's right of decisionmaking.
Pairing these aspects leads to a right to marry the person of one's choosing.5
This analysis helps attack the argument that homosexuals have a fundamental
right to marry, as long as their chosen spouse is of the opposite sex. The same
argument was employed in defending antimiscegenation laws-individuals were
free to marry, the State of Virginia argued, as long as their chosen spouse was of
the same race. As the Supreme Court recognized in Loving, such restrictions
impermissibly impede the fundamental right to marry the person of one's
choosing-ideally, the person the individual loves the most. Jax concludes that
"this fundamental right of the individual to marry is one that should remain with
the individual regardless of the sex of the individual whom they wish to marry."58
b. Strict Scrutiny Applies Because Marriage
Is a Fundamental Right
Proponents argue that the right to marry the person of one's choosing is a
fundamental right belonging to the individual; therefore, governments must have
a compelling reason to restrict the right. 9 Additionally, if the reason for the
restriction is compelling, the law must actually serve the state-claimed purpose."

56. Id. at 850.
57. See Jax, supra note 34, at 466-67.
58. Id. at 467; see also Cox, supra note 48, at 1056-57:
[T]he Hawaii Supreme Court made the same error that the United States Supreme
Court made in Bowers v. Hardwick.Just as the Bowers Court erred by focusing
on the existence of a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, instead of
recognizing a fundamental right to privacy in one's choice of sexual partners, so
too did the Baehr court err by focusing on the existence of a fundamental right to
same-sex marriage, instead of applying the already recognized fundamental right
to marry to same-sex couples.
59. But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) ("[W]e do not believe that a right
to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our people that
failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.").
60. If a right is fundamental, a law restricting that right will be subject to strict scrutiny. A
law that restricts a fundamental right will be presumed unconstitutional unless the state proves
it has a compelling reason to restrict it, and that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the
governmental purpose. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (holding that Pennsylvania's
differing statute of limitations for paternity suits-6 years for illegitimate births, unlimited time
period for legitimate births-violated the Equal Protection Clause); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that a Virginia poll tax payment used as a
precondition to voting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it restricted the right to
vote based on affluence of the voter); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding
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Proponents either argue that the asserted governmental purposes are not
compelling, or, if they are compelling, that they are not furthered by the
restriction. Reasons for the restriction include: prejudice towards homosexuals,
promotion of procreation, public morality, and interest in the upbringing of
children.'
i. Prejudice Towards Homosexuals
First, proponents of same-sex marriage allege that prejudice is an
impermissible governmental purpose 2 This argument gained a strong foothold
after the recent Supreme Court decision in Romer v. Evans.63 The Supreme Court
in Romer struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution which
prohibited any legislative or judicial action aimed at preventing discrimination
against gays and lesbians. The Court held that prejudice towards a particular
group is an impermissible justification for laws." It is true that Romer v. Evans
involved an equal protection claim, not the deprivation of fundamental rights.
Still, the basic principle of governmental purpose is the same and is instructive
in the area of substantive due process. The government in Romer only needed to
prove its purpose was legitimate, and the Supreme Court found that animus
towards a group of people did not cross that threshold. Contrastingly, if the
government had interfered with a fundamental right, its purpose would have had
to have been compelling. If animus is not legitimate, it certainly cannot be
compelling.
ii. Procreation
Next, with marriage defined as a fundamental right to marry the person of
one's choosing, proponents argue that the promotion of procreation does not

Oklahoma law that provided for sterilization of criminals violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it denied the fundamental right to precreation and it applied to some criminals and not
others).
61. See supraPart II.A.
62. See Trosino, supra note 12, at 108 (analogizing the prejudice behind miscegenation
laws to the prejudice which drives restrictions on gay marriage). "Although the white
supremacist feared the loss of white preeminence, the heterosexual supremacist fears the loss
of heterosexual dominance." Id.
63. 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
64. See William Eskridge, Credit is Due: Same-Sex Marriageand the U.S. Constitution's
'FullFaith and Credit' Clause, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, at 11, 11 (asserting that the
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans held that animus towards homosexuals "is not a legitimate
state interest, much less an important public policy"); see also Deitrich, supra note 1, at 140
n.159 (maintaining that the Supreme Court has said that laws which give effect to private bias
are invalid, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
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qualify as compelling either.6" Even if the governmental interest of procreation
were found to be compelling, proponents of same-sex marriage argue that the
restriction neither furthers nor is substantially related to that state interest. For
example, they discount the procreation reason for the restriction by noting that
some gay couples are currently either having or adopting children, and some
heterosexual married couples live in childless marriages.66
iii. The Upbringing of Children
Although a state interest in the upbringing of children is compelling,
proponents argue that outlawing same-sex marriage does not ensure that children
will be safeguarded from harm. First, proponents point to trouble (divorce,
violence, and abuse) within the "traditional" American family to attack state
arguments preferring heterosexual families for the raising of children. Indeed
some argue that the traditional family has never existed, and that it is possible
that homosexual parents would be better parents.67 In response to their
opponents' worries that homosexuals raising children will cause homosexuality
to spread, they note studies that show that incidence of homosexuality in children
of gay parents is the same as when children have heterosexual parents.

65. One commefitator contended that a state interest in procreation is no longer compelling:
"The idea that the survival of the race is a compelling state interest that is in jeopardy is simply
ludicrous. This country is in no danger of becoming underpopulated." Jax, supra note 34, at
468.
66. See D'Amato, supra note 17, at 932-33 ("Same-sex couples are not, by definition,
incapable of having children or raising a family. Many gays and lesbians have children from
prior relationships .... In addition, many homosexuals have children by artificial insemination
and surrogacy as well as by adoption.").
67. Steven Homer comments in his note on the state of traditional marriage and family life,
noting the prevalence of divorce, remarriage, and single-parent households: "[T]he actual
experience of most American families differs considerably from the rhetoric associated with
the family in many judicial opinions." Homer, supra note 6, at 521; see also D'Amato, supra
note 17, at 940 (alleging that "there is no 'typical' American family"). "[The majority of]
families today comprise nontraditional arrangements consisting of single parent units resulting
from divorce and unmarried motherhood, step-families, grandparent-grandchild units, senior
citizen group homes, pseudo-parent-child units, and unmarried heterosexual, lesbian and gay
family units." Id.; see also Herbert A. Sample, House Opposes Same-Sex Marriage,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 13, 1996, at Al (quoting Rep. Steve Gunderson, openly gay member
of Congress from Wisconsin, responding to proponents of the DOMA: "'marriage might be
under attack from alcohol abuse, spousal abuse and, I might suggest, even Sunday afternoon
football').
68. James Trosino notes that studies show children of gay parents are no more likely than
children of heterosexual parents to become homosexual. Additionally, he asserts that the notion
that homosexuals are pedophiles is a persistent myth and observes that children are actually less
likely to be molested by a homosexual adult than by a heterosexual adult. See Trosino, supra
note 12, at I10-11.
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iv. Morality
Like the government's interest in the upbringing of children, according to the
Supreme Court, states have a compelling interest in making restrictions based on
morality.69 The Supreme Court approved an asserted governmental interest in
morality in Bowers. Moreover, it appears at first glance that laws against samesex marriage further that governmental end. However, what the Court in Bowers
neglected to recognize was that morality is defined differently by different
people. Whose morals was the Court protecting? The Supreme Court has held
after Bowers that "[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code. ' 70 Proponents of same-sex marriage can argue that a
governmental purpose of public morality is not furthered by the restriction
because it is not clear what public morality is. Nevertheless, the fact that the
judiciary is likely to grant much deference to states in this area, considering that
regulation of marriage has traditionally been accorded to the states,7' leaves the
decision of this issue under substantive due process uncertain.
2. Equal Protection Guarantees Same-Sex Couples the
Right to Marry
The argument that same-sex marriage bans violate the equal protection rights
of same-sex couples who have been refused marriage certificates is the most
successful argument to date in the battle for same-sex marriage recognition.7
Because the restriction disallows marriage to persons who choose a partner of the
same sex, these persons are treated dissimilarly to applicants who choose

69. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
70. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
71. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court expressed such deference to legislative
regulation of marriage:
There can be no doubt that the Legislature may prescribe who may many; the age
at which they may marry; the procedure and form essential to constitute marriage;
the duties and obligations created by marriage.... Nor can there be any doubt
that the Legislature has full power to prescribe reasonable regulations relating to
marriage and to provide punishment for those who solemnize or'contract marriage
contrary to statutory command. The regulation of marriage and divorce has been
fully recognized as a matter within the exclusive province of the Legislatures of
the states.
Sweigart v. State, 12 N.E.2d 134, 138 (Ind. 1938) (citation omitted).
72. This argument succeeded in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii
Supreme Court did not, however, find the state's discrimination against homosexuals
impermissible. On the contrary, the court held that homosexuals are not a suspect class;
therefore, the state need only have a rational basis for discriminating against them. Instead, the
court found that laws which deny same-sex couples the right to many amounted to
impermissible gender discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes 73, 77.
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partners of the opposite sex-gender-based discrimination. In Baehr v. Lewin,
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the Hawaii Constitution explicitly prohibits
discrimination based on gender, and that laws that discriminate on that basis are
subject to strict scrutiny.73 Hawaii's approach to gender discrimination differs
from the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of gender discrimination, in that
Hawaii affords more protection based on gender. The U.S. Supreme Court
requires that governments have an important, instead of compelling, reason for
discriminating on the basis of gender, and that laws substantially further the
governmental interest (so-called "intermediate scrutiny")."
Laws rarely survive the application of strict scrutiny. When a state passes laws
that discriminate against members of a suspect class, the laws are presumed
unconstitutional. Because this presumption is so strong, most are predicting that
Hawaii will soon recognize same-sex marriages.75 Perhaps such a holding is not
inescapable in states which do not apply such rigorous scrutiny to laws that
discriminate on the basis of gender. Even if states other than Hawaii apply
traditional intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications, proponents are
ready to argue that asserted governmental interests are not important enough and
that the restriction is not substantially related to such interests.76
The plaintiffs in Baehrargued that they were discriminated against on the basis
of gender. The plaintiffs insisted that they were refused marriage licenses from
the state because of their gender;" that is, Ninia Baehr would have been allowed
to marry Genora Dancel if either one of them were a man instead of a woman.
Therefore, a woman is accorded different treatment than a man, in that a man can
marry a woman, but a woman cannot. A man is treated differently from a woman,
as well, in that the woman can marry a man, but a man cannot.
Courts facing equal protection claims before Baehr have simply held that male
and female applicants are treated the same, because both may be prohibited from
marrying a partner of the same sex.78 Hawaii was the first to give credence to the
fact that the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginiarejected an analogous argument
by the State of Virginia.79 Virginia argued that all persons regardless of race were
equally prohibited from marrying a person of another race, but the Supreme
Court recognized that the underlying reason was promotion of white supremacy

73. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
74. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 64. Indeed the flood of legislation regarding same-sex
marriage recognition hitting many state legislatures is evidence that people are taking Hawaii's
treatment of this case seriously.
76. See, e.g., Zambrowicz, supra note 21, at 942-49.
77. See Baehr, 852 P.2d 44.
78. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
79. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68.
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and would not allow it.80 Commentators on the issue of same-sex marriage
contend that the reason underlying the same-sex marriage ban is "heterosexism"
1
and is just as invalid as the racism that prompted bans on interracial marriage.
The bottom line, which the Hawaii Supreme Court understood, is that
miscegenation laws violated the Lovings' rights to equal protection of the laws,
because a white person was permitted to marry another white person, but a black
person was not. 2 The same is true for a man who wishes to mary a man. A
person of the opposite gender has that right, but a man does not.83
The argument that the equal protection rights of homosexuals as a class are
violated by laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples is distinct from the
conception of such laws as discriminatory on the basis of gender.8 4 Based on
Bowers, the progeny of gays-in-the-military cases,85 and the cases upholding bans
on same-sex marriage, however, it is safe to conclude that courts have shied away

80. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1. (1967). "[T]he fact of equal application does not
immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race." Id. at 9. "The
fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that
the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain
White Supremacy." Id. at 11.
81. See Trosino, supranote 12, at 108.
82. See Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
83. See Cox, supra note 48, at 1051:
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the notion that "equal application" of the
anti-miscegenation statute to both whites and blacks immunized the statute from
running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, the Baehr plurality simply
substituted "sex" for "race" to reject [dissenting Justice] Heen's argument that,
because the statutes denying same-sex marriage applied to both men and women,
they were not based on sex discrimination.
84. The gender discrimination argument assumes that sexual orientation is irrelevant-a
heterosexual person could conceivably choose to marry a person of the same gender.
85. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (affirming, upon rehearing en banc,
district court's holding that policy prohibiting persons with homosexual orientation from
serving in Navy did not violate plaintiff's equal protection rights); High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that policy of conducting
expanded background investigation for gay and lesbian applicants for top secret security
clearance did not unconstitutionally restrict equal protection or freedom of association rights);
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding disqualification of U.S. Army
Reserve officer as not violative of plaintiff's rights of free speech or equal protection); Beller
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding plaintiffs' dismissal for engaging in
homosexual conduct). But see Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing
to vacate district court's order requiring the reinstatement of National Guard colonel who
admitted homosexual orientation in top secret clearance interview); Meinhold v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that discharging Navy serviceman
who made statement that he was gay on national television program violated serviceman's
constitutional rights to equal protection); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991)
(reversing district court's dismissal of army officer's complaint and finding officer's complaint
stated a claim for violation of equal protection rights).
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from recognizing homosexuals as a suspect class. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.86 has been

interpreted as an example of the Court's reluctance to recognize new suspect
classes. Consequently, it is unlikely that the current Court would expand equal
protection to give homosexuals greater protection, despite the fact that
homosexuals as a group have historically suffered from widespread
discrimination and prejudice. 7 Some advocates recommend focusing on
alternative arguments, because "[d]espite its plausibility ...

the argument that

homosexuals are entitled to special protection from discrimination is unlikely to
be accepted by the Court that decided Bowers, and in any case perhaps we can
build more narrowly on existing law."88
Finally, some recent developments in constitutional law present another avenue
for advocates of same-sex marriage to explore for possible arguments. While the
Supreme Court has not recognized homosexuals as a suspect class for purposes
of equal protection analysis, it has nonetheless provided some protection for
homosexuals in a recent case. In Romer v. Evans, 9 the Court struck down a state
constitutional amendment as violative of the plaintiffs' equal protection rights.
The amendment would have prohibited any Colorado governmental unit from
giving homosexuals special rights or protections. ° The Court found the law was
motivated by animus for a particular class of people, and held this purpose, far
from being compelling, was illegitimate and improperf' Although a court will

86. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (using the rational-basis level of review to overturn a zoning
ordinance that treated mentally retarded individuals dissimilarly than others); see Linda E.
Carter, IntermediateScrutiny Under Fire: Will Plyler Survive State Legislation to Exclude
Undocumented Childrenfrom School?, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 345, 379 (1997) (observing that as

a result of Cleburne, "the Court does not appear inclined to extend liberally what is identified
as intermediate scrutiny to new categories"); see also Philip P. Frickey, The Foolon the Hill:
CongressionalFindings,ConstitutionalAdjudication, andUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.

RES. L. REv. 695, 726 (1996) ("The majority opinion of Justice White [in Cleburne] firmly
rejected applying intermediate scrutiny, essentially fearing it would produce a slippery slope
for other cases brought by permanently disabled persons.").
87. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 7-9.
88. Id. at 9; see also Zambrowicz, supranote 21, at 932. But see Jax, supra note 34, at 47378 (arguing that homosexuals should be recognized as a suspect class).
89. 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
90. See id.
at 1623. The amendment repealed existing ordinances which sought to prevent
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and prohibited any executive, legislative, or
judicial action intended to protect homosexuals. See id.
91. See id. at 1627. The Court held:
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even [the rational basis] inquiry. First, the
amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group, an exceptional and .. .invalid form of

legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class that it affects ....
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typically accept any rational basis for a challenged law that does not deprive a
suspect class of equal protection, affording the legislature considerable
deference, Romer is one of a handful of cases in which the Supreme Court has
applied rational basis review,92 yet struck down the law in question. Because of
this, some have termed the Court's scrutiny93 in cases such as Romer as
"heightened" or "active" rational basis review.
Regardless of the debate over whether the Court has added a fourth tier to its
equal protection scrutiny or is legitimately invalidating laws that have no rational
basis, it is possible that laws which prohibit marriages between homosexuals
would likewise not survive rational basis review. This would avoid having to
prove that homosexuals are a suspect class. The more tenuous gender
discrimination argument would not be necessary either. Instead, such laws would
fail because the legislature was only motivated by animus for a particular group
of people: "Romer thus embodies.a ban on laws motivated by a desire to create
This was the forbidden motivation that the Court
second-class citizenship....
' 94
described as 'animus. ,
Certainly, Romer seems to strike a blow at Bowers-the punishment of
homosexual sodomy (which is what the Court confined its decision to in Bowers,
leaving the validity of the restriction on heterosexual sodomy unconsidered) is
undoubtedly motivated by animus towards a class of people. Yet the Court in
Romer failed even to make mention of the case, and Bowers continues to stand
as good law despite the inconsistencies between it and Romer: "Hardwick
seemed to say that it is legitimate for the state to express disapproval of
homosexual conduct, indeed that it is legitimate for the state to express that
disapproval via the criminal law."95 Some argue that a challenge to a statute
criminalizing homosexual sodomy would not likely survive today, in light of
Romer.96 While Bowers involved a fundamental-rights, substantive-due-process
challenge, Romer involved an equal protection challenge-a plaintiff punished
for violating a homosexual sodomy statute can claim his equal protection rights
were violated. Such a statute would treat homosexuals differently than
heterosexuals, and a purpose other than animus towards homosexuals would have
to be given for the law to be upheld.97

92. Rational basis review is used by courts when the challenged restrictiop discriminates
against a nonsuspect class or does not interfere with fundamental rights. The law will be upheld
as long as "it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." Id.
93. See Courtney G. Joslin, Equal Protectionand Anti-Gay Legislation:Dismantling the
Legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick-Romer v. Evans, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 225, 239-40
(1997).
94. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 63
(1996).
95. Id. at 64-65.
96. See Joslin, supranote 93, at 244.
97. See id. at 245.
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3. Evolution
Despite the remonstrance of Representative Barr that the United States must
not lead the world in discarding the traditional conception.of marriage,98 five
nations across the Atlantic have provided legal recognition and distributed
benefits to their same-sex couples." That other nations, and even states and cities
within our nation,' 0 are passing domestic partnership legislation, that gay rights
bills have been passed,' 0' and that some corporations have begun giving
employee benefits to the same-sex partners of their employees, 2 all indicate that
society is edging ever closer to acceptance of gays and lesbians. It is in this
evolution of morality and law that a strong case for same-sex marriage
recognition can be made.
There is no question that constitutional law has embodied an evolutionary
spirit in the last half of this century. The majority of high court justices have
understood that times, values, and norms change, and have frequently fashioned
their jurisprudence accordingly. Whether or not this amounts to a travesty
depends upon one's view of the proper extent of the judicial role. Regardless, the
Supreme Court and the high courts of the several states have been drawing lines
between maintaining tradition and adapting the law to new scenarios. A prime
example is the recent decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Wasson. 3 Nineteen years earlier, the same court denied the claims of two
women wishing to marry each other, because they did not fit the definition of
marriage as it was traditionally defined.' In Wasson, the court determined that
a law making same-sex sodomy a crime was unconstitutional in that it violated

98. See Gray, supra note 26, at 1.
99. See Uncas Fernandez, Lawmaker Confident Leap Toward Same-Sex Marriagein Brazil
Won't Be Last, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Dec. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12198437
(listing Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden as nations where domestic
partnership legislation is in effect, and discussing the pending bill in Brazil as likely to
succeed). The Netherlands recently adopted a matrimonial registry law for homosexual
partnerships as well. See Joanne von Alroth, Gay Couples' Registry Backed in Oak Park,CHI.
TRIB., July 26, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 3575583.
100. See, e.g., Julie Forster, Colorado: Denver, IBM Extend Employee Benefits to Gay
Workers, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 23, 1996, at 9956, available in 1996 WL 533147
(reporting that three states provide benefits to gay and lesbian domestic partners and over 30
cities across the U.S. do so as well).
101. See Riccucci & Gossett, supra note 17.
102. See Forster, supra note 100; see also Bettina Boxall, A New Era Set to Beginfor Gay
Couples, Domestic Partners,L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1997, at A3, availablein 1997 WL 2226887
(reporting that nearly a quarter of companies with more than 5000 employees offer health
benefits to their employees' nontraditional partners, whether homosexual or not, including
American Express, Apple Computer, Bank of America, IBM, and the State of New York).
103. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
104. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
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equal protection and the right of privacy. 5 Jonathan Deitrich, in his discussion
of this case, commented:
Under the due process or privacy prong, the Wasson court noted that morality
is an evolving concept. After chastising the United States Supreme Court for
its "misdirected application of the theory of original intent" in Bowers, the
court pointed to Loving, where "a contemporary, enlightened interpretation
of the liberty interest" struck down the anti-miscegenation statute, despite the
fact that it was "highly unlikely that protecting the rights of persons of
different races to [marry] was one of the considerations behind the Fourteenth

Amendment." As evidence of the "moral evolution" in the present context,
the court noted that in 1961 all fifty states outlawed sodomy, whereas in 1992
barely half continued to do so."16
Another pertinent example, highlighted by commentator Anthony D. D'Amato,
is found in former assumptions about women and marriage. 0 7 Former tradition,
once embodied in the law of the states, dictated that "a married woman had no
independent legal status of her own."'0 0 Through a process of legislative and
judicial evolution, such concepts have been discarded as law and morality
evolved. 9
Across the country, and indeed in other nations, a new tolerance and
acceptance of gay and lesbian individuals is growing, albeit slowly."0 Just as

105. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487; see also Deitrich, supra note 1, at 137 ("[The court's]
opinion thoroughly punctured the 'majoritarian morality' justification.").
106. Deitrich, supra note 1, at 138 (emphasis added) (quoting Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 497).
107. See D'Amato, supra note 17, at 934.
108. Id.
109. Cf Sunstein, supra note 10, at 20-21. Sunstein has theorized, though, that the
opposition to same-sex relations stems from traditional formulations of the gender caste system:
Perhaps same-sex marriages are banned because of what they do to-because of
how they unsettle-gender categories. Perhaps same-sex marriages are banned
because they complicate traditional gender thinking, showing that the division of
human beings into two simple kinds is part of sex-role stereotyping, however true
it is that women and men are "different."
Id

110. See Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex MarriagesBe Recognized in Sister States?:
FullFaithand Creditand Due ProcessLimitations on States'Choiceof Law Regardingthe
Status and Incidents of Homosexual MarriagesFollowing Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 569-70 (1994):
Greater visibility of lesbians and gay men, coupled with the spread of domestic
partnership ordinances throughout the country, which set the stage for granting
certain rights and benefits usually associated with marriage, suggest that the
majority of individuals in society no longer feel abhorrence toward homosexuals
and, in fact, even believe that lesbians and gay men deserve some of the same
partnership protections that married couples enjoy.
But see Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church:Homosexual Rights Legislation,
Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 405-06 n.43 (1994)

(citing a 1993 poll which demonstrated that while 65% of the respondents agreed homosexuals
should have equal rights, as many as 73% said they opposed same-sex marriages and 70%
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traditions about women and men in marriage have changed, and traditions against
interracial marriage, once shrouded in morality and law, have been considered
and discarded, it is rational to reconsider the requests for same-sex marriage in
light of evolving concepts of equality due to homosexuals."' "Recognizing outof-state, same-sex marriages would be a first step toward shedding another
archaic policy-one that treats homosexuals as second-class citizens by denying
them the right to marry.""' 2
Another example of legal evolution is evident in cases in which courts have
recognized same-sex partners as families. In Braschi v. Stahl Associates,"3 the
court held that for purposes of a New York rent control statute, which prohibited
landlords from evicting family members of deceased tenants, the statute applied
to a same-sex partner of a deceased tenant."' The court wrestled with the concept
of change and concluded: "The intended protection against sudden eviction
should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead
should find its foundation in the reality of family life."'" 5
In another case, an Ohio appeals court held that the state's Domestic Violence
Act" 6 protected a same-sex partner, though the language of the statute
contemplated "'person living as a spouse.""' 7 In light of such cases, one
commentator noted: "If same-sex couples have the necessary characteristics to
qualify as a family for certain situations, logic dictates that same-sex couples
have the right to consummate that familial relationship with marriage.""' Finally,
in Florida, a state which bans both homosexual marriage and adoption, an
appeals court recently enforced a cohabitation agreement formed between two
homosexual adults.19

opposed adoption rights for homosexuals); Laura Vozzella, Home-Grown Crime ScarierThan
Serial Killers, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 6, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL

11897630 (reporting that antigay violence and crime is on the rise, and that incidents seem to
increase in frequency after news reports about gay issues, such as the gay marriage litigation).
S111.
See D'Amato, supra note 17, at 935-36.
112. Id. at 936.
113. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 53.
116. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Anderson 1996).
117. State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (quoting OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.25(E)(1)(a) (Page Supp. 1990); see also D'Amato, supra note 17, at 938
(discussing Hadinger).

118. Zambrowicz, supranote 21, at 928; see also D'Amato, supra note 17, at 937. Other
judicial actions have included application of palimony doctrine to cases involving same-sex
couples and awards of marital incidents (benefits from Workers' Compensation) to a same-sex
lover of a deceased worker. See id. ("The [California Compensation] Board reasoned that to
hold otherwise would result in an inequitable distribution of property based on nothing more
than prejudice against homosexuals.").
119. See Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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To summarize, an evolving jurisprudence is evidence that the time has come,
or will come soon, to recognize same-sex marriage.'20 The Hawaii Supreme Court
acknowledged this when it concluded that the ban on same-sex marriage
amounted to gender-based discrimination.' 2 ' It is pertinent to consider that
"Baehr 1is
the first case in which a court imagines that same-sex couples could
22
marry."
III. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, AND THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

With the recognition of same-sex marriage by at least one state looming ever
closer, the question on everyone's mind is, What effect will a decision in favor
of same-sex marriages in Hawaii have on the rest of the states? The answer is not
altogether clear, but some are very concerned about it. Since the 1993 decision
by the Hawaii Supreme Court," several state legislatures and the U.S. Congress
have considered the matter. Warned by advocates for same-sex marriage that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause' 24 will require every state in the union to recognize
marriages solemnized in Hawaii, legislatures opposing such a result have begun
passing legislation refusing to recognize such marriages.' 25 Congress recently

120. But see Sunstein, supra note 10, at 25-27 (arguing for judicial restraint in this area in
order to avoid a mass revolt by the people and to avoid damage to the public's confidence in
the judiciary).
121. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993). "[W]e do not believe that trial
judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply
demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs change with an
evolving social order." Id. at 63.
122. Homer, supranote 6, at 509 (emphasis added).
123. Baehr, 852 P.2d 44.
124. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
125. See, e.g., Bruno Tedeschi, Assembly Panel OKs Bill Banning Gay Marriages,Deletes
'PublicPolicy'Provision,REcoRD, Jan. 24, 1997, at A04, availablein 1997 WL 6870882. A
survey of states which have recently passed nonrecognition statutes includes the following:
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1996) (effective May 7, 1996)), Arizona (ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-112, 25-101 (West Supp. 1996)), Arkansas (1997 Ark. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 144 (Michie)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (Supp. 1996) (amendment
effective June 21, 1996)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Supp. 1997) (effective April
2, 1996)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West
1997)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 93 (West 1997)), Michigan (MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 551.1-272 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997)), Mississippi (MISS. CODEANN. § 93-1-1 (Supp.
1997)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (Supp. 1996)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West Supp. 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1997)), Pennsylvania (23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West Supp. 1997)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996)),
Utah (UTAH CODEANN. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4 (Supp. 1997)), and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 2045.2 (Michie Supp. 1997)). The following states have recently passed legislation disapproving
of same-sex marriage, without specifically stating that the state refuses to recognize same-sex
marriages solemnized elsewhere: Illinois (750 ILL. COM. STAT. 5/212 (West Supp. 1997)
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endorsed such state statutes and limited the meaning of marriage in the context
of federal laws. The issue remains whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause
compels recognition in other states of a same-sex marriage legally procured in
another state, or whether, under conflict-of-laws doctrine, states may choose
their own law over the law of the state where the marriage validly took place.
Equally important is whether Congress acted within its power in adopting the
DOMA.
A. The Validity of the DOMA
Proponents of same-sex marriage understandably speak in harsh terms about
the DOMA. 26
' DOMA represents Congress's and the president's refusal to accept
the gains made in Hawaii towards recognition of such marriages. Proponents of
same-sex marriage argue that DOMA is invalid because Congress has
traditionally left regulation of marriage and family matters to the states, deferring
to state definitions in construing federal laws touching on marriage and family.
It would appear, though, from the plain reading of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause that Congress has the power to designate what effect a state's laws will
have in other states. The Clause states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by generalLaws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedingsshall be proved, and the Effect thereof."'27
Moreover, that Congress has traditionally deferred to state definitions of
marriage is not a persuasive argument, in light of the fact that Congress has never

(amendment effective May 24, 1996)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (1988 & Supp.
1996)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1991)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1996)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 251-1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997)).
126. Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). DOMA is codified at 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West
1997):
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation,
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
It is also codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997):
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian Tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
127. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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been faced with the prospect of one state recognizing same-sex marriages.' One
commentator has defended DOMA by claiming that it simply clarifies the law:
it provides definitions for federal laws, and it reiterates that states have the
power to not recognize aberrant laws from other states under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.'2 9
B. Does the Full Faith and Credit Clause Compel
Recognition?
Proponents of same-sex marriage make bold assertions that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause 3 ' will compel recognition by other states of same-sex marriages
solemnized in Hawaii. But this result is not so obvious. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause exists for the basic purpose of ensuring that a judgment rendered in one
state will retain the force of law in another state. In constructing the clause, the
framers did not want states to ignore the judgments' rendered and laws'
passed by their sister states. As a result, states are obligated, out of deference and
mutual respect, to give sister state judgments the same credit that they would be
given in the sister state.' 33 In short, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that
acts, records, and judicial proceedings procured in one state be enforced in other
states. It would seem that marriage statutes and marriage decrees can be
contemplated within the bounds of the Clause.' 34 However, marriage laws have

128. See Defense of Marriage Hearing,supra note 25 (prepared statement of Lynn D.
Wardle):
The reasonable presumption that when using marriage terms in federal legislation
Congress generally intended to incorporate the relevant "ordinary" state definition
of marriage underscores the need for Congress to clarify that it does not intend to
include same-sex unions when it uses marriage terms in federal laws.
129. See id.; see also infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

131. See Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage?Constitutionaland Choice of Law
Argumentsfor Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages,47 STAN. L. REV. 499, 501 (1995) ("[T]he
law has been settled since the early nineteenth century that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires every state to recognize judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction from other
states.").
132. See id. at 502. The author asserts, however, that law, both statutory and judicial,
receives weaker consideration than judgments under the Clause. See id. The author concludes
that although there may be reason for according law less respect, such law must be respected
when it is applicable, under choice-of-law rules, in a case. See id. at 503.
133. See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
448 (1989) ("While the area is not free of uncertainty, the basic obligation of federal full faith
and credit is firm. State courts must give as much effect to sister-state judgments as they would
have where rendered.").
134. See Henson, supranote 110, at 586-87 (stating that marriage may not be an "act" or
"judgment" but is certainly a public "record").
[N]o one would quibble with the assertion that marriage, regulated by state
statutes, confers many private rights and benefits upon those who enter its
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not been traditionally considered enforceable under the Clause-indeed, the
requirements for marriage vary significantly from state to state. Instead, the area
has predominantly been handled in the conflict-of-laws context. 5
As mentioned above, the Clause accords Congress an enforcement power to
prescribe the effect of acts, records, and proceedings. Congress has rarely
exercised this power. Passage of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
("PKPA") 36 was only the second time Congress used its enforcement power
under the Clause; in passing DOMA, Congress used its enforcement power for
the fourth time.137 A plain reading of the enforcement provision in the Clause
clearly indicates that Congress can limit or extend states' obligation to give credit
to another state's judgments and decrees.
Further, the Supreme Court has not considered the Full Faith and Credit
obligation as an absolute dictate. In a state workers' compensation case, the
Supreme Court held that one state may not impose upon other states the effect of
its aberrantlaws and judgments. In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 38 the
Court said: "To vest the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of a
State's own laws and judgments in the State itself risks the very kind of parochial
entrenchment on the interests of other States that it was the purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause ...to 'prevent."' 3 9 In an earlier case, in which the

sanctified doors. Therefore, the act of marriage and subsequent civil effects that
flow from the act should be subject to full faith and credit protection in the same
way as occurs in the case of divorce.
Id. at 587.
135. See LESLIE J.
HARRIs ET AL., FAMILY LAW 257 (1996):
Recognition by one state of marriages contracted in another state is generally a
matter of policy governed by principles of choice of law rather than a matter of
compulsion under the full faith and credit clause, unless the marriage has been the
subject of ajudicial proceeding (as through an annulment action or declaratory
judgment proceeding).
136. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West 1994).
In the PKPA, Congress used this grant of power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
direct states on when they should recognize custody decrees rendered in other states, in the
interests of preventing the kidnapping of children by noncustodial parents.
137. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997). The first time Congress used its
enforcement power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause was 1948, when it passed a statute
providing for the proof and admission of any state's court records and judicial proceedings in
all other states' courts: "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings.., shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (West 1994). Congress also provided for the interstate
enforcement of child support orders in 1994. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B (West Supp. 1997).
138.448 U.S. 261 (1980).
139. Id at 272; accordNevadav. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). The Supreme Court, in holding
that the State of Nevada could not clairfi immunity from suit brought in California court by
California residents for personal injuries sustained from a vehicle collision between plaintiffs
and a Nevada state employee, stated:
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Supreme Court affirmed a California court's application of its own workers'
compensation law to an out-of-state insurer even though the insurer would not
have been made a party under a conflicting Massachusetts statute, the Court said:
[W]e think the conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith and credit clause
does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to
persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even
though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its
enactment with respect to the same persons and events. 40
Therefore, the fact that Hawaii will be the only state in the union to recognize
same-sex marriage bolsters the validity of other states' refusal of recognition of
marriages celebrated there, at least under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
C. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine
Laws governing marriage vary significantly from state to state. Because people
not uncommonly marry in states other than their domicile for various reasons,
conflict-of-laws doctrine has developed with respect to the issue of marriage
recognition. Each state is free to choose its own method of determining whether
its law or the law of the state where the marriage was celebrated will govern
judicial proceedings involving the marriage." Despite the disparity, however,

In this case, California has "declared its will"; it has adopted as its policy full
compensation in its courts for injuries on its highways resulting from the
negligence of others, whether those others be residents or nonresidents, agents of
the State, or private citizens. Nothing in the Federal Constitution authorizes or
obligates this Court to frustrate that policy out of enforced respect for the
sovereignty of Nevada. In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the
consent of the governed. The people of Nevada have consented to a system in
which their State is subject only to limited liability in tort. But the people of
California, who have had no voice in Nevada's decision, have adopted a different
system. Each of these decisions is equally entitled to our respect. It may be wise
policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, for States to accord each
other immunity or to respect any established limits on liability. They are free to
do so. But if a federal court were to hold, by inference from the structure of our
Constitution and nothing else, that California is not free in this case to enforce its
policy of full compensation, that holding would constitute the real intrusion on
the sovereignty of the States-and the power of the people-in our Union.
Id. at 426-27.
140. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939).
"It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some limitations upon the extent to
which a state may be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment
of another state in contravention of its own statutes or policy." Id.
141. See SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 133, at 160 ("State courts usually apply
their own common law rules.").
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a majority rule has emerged.' 42 As indicated in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, a marriage valid where solemnized is valid everywhere, except
and
where another forum has the most significant contacts to the 14marriage
3
recognition would violate the forum state's strong public policy.
States following the approach of choice-of-law questions of the Restatement
(Second) first presume the validity of a marriage validly performed in another
state. 44 A state may refuse to recognize a marriage validly performed elsewhere
only if it determines it has the most significant relationship with the parties to the
marriage and that its strong public policy would be violated by recognizing the
marriage. The Restatement (Second) lists seven factors that help courts determine
which state has the most significant relationship with the spouses and marriage:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.' 45
Even if, after considering these factors, the state determines that it has the most
significant relationship with the parties and marriage, it still must recognize the
marriage as valid if the state does not have a strong public policy against
recognition.'46

142. Professor Barbara J. Cox reports that 23 states plus the District of Columbia use the
choice-of-law approach represented in the Restatement (Second). See Cox, supra note 48, at
1096. Other approaches have not attracted similar devotion. These approaches include: the
Restatement approach (15 states); governmental interest analysis (4 states); and choiceinfluencing considerations theory (5 states). See id. at 1083-97. The approach of the three
remaining states is "impossible to classify under any given approach." Id. at 1083 n.283. The
doctrinal differences between these approaches is beyond the scope of this Note; the fact that
Indiana uses the Restatement (Second), see id. at 1096, will become important later. An
excellent survey can be found in Barbara Cox's article. See id. at 1083-97.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(l)-(2) (1988); see also
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.5, at 421-23 (1982). The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act recommends a more liberal approach, requiring recognition of the
marriage without consideration of the state's public policy. See Note, In Sickness and In
Health, In Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages,109 HARv. L. REv. 2038, 2051 (1996).
144. In fact, the Restatement (Second) reflects a general policy in favor of marriage

validation. See Cox, supra note 48, at 1064. There are several practical reasons supporting this
policy, including protecting the parties' expectations and providing stability where children and
property are involved. See id. at 1065. Moreover, the rule "'avoids the potentially hideous
problems that would arise if the legality of a marriage varied from state to state."' Id. (quoting
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 116, at 362 (2d ed.

1993)).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
146. See Cox, supra note 48, at 1095.

§§ 6,283.
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What amounts to a strong public policy? If it exists, it will be found in the
state's court decisions, legislation, and constitution. 4 7 Specifically, if a state has
statutory law prohibiting same-sex marriage, or common law to the same effect,
courts handling a recognition case will probably find that recognition would
violate the state's strong public policy. A specific, or perhaps even a general,
marriage evasion statute would have the same effect for the state's residents who
travel to the state where marriages are legally solemnized, and then return to their
domicile. If the state retains legislation criminalizing homosexual sodomy, courts
may find the law to be evidence of the state's strong public policy against
recognition.' 48 Lastly, courts may invoke public sentiment and morality that
opposes recognition as evidence of a strong public policy.'49
Litigants could argue, however, that there are valid public policy reasons in
favor of recognizing same-sex marriages validly solemnized elsewhere. States
that have "validation statutes," which presume the validity of out-of-state
marriages,"' and those which have passed statutes prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation... may in fact have a public policy in favor of
recognition (or at least no strong public policy against recognition). Beyond
statutory law, a court faced with a recognition case should consider the
obligations (though concededly not absolute) of comity and reciprocal treatment
inherent in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 5 2 Moreover, considerations of
family stability and children favor recognition, especially considering that samesex couples are presently living like families and are reproducing and adopting
children now, anyway. Still, if states can muster a strong public policy, they are
within their rights in refusing to recognize the marriage, and counterarguments
may not suc~eed.
As previously mentioned, however, even a state with a demonstrated strong
public policy against recognition of same-sex marriages may have to recognize

147. See Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law
Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages,53 MD. L. REv. 450, 457
(1994).
148. See id. at 485.
149. See id. at 491.
150. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have validation statutes. See Cox, supra
note 48, at 1066-67; Keane, supra note 131, at 515 n.103. Five other states, including Illinois,
Georgia, Arizona, Louisiana, and North Dakota, have validation statutes that are weakened by
provisions that except marriages that would be against the laws of the state, or against the
state's public policy. See Cox, supra note 48, at 1068.
151. In 1994, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia all had state statutes prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination. See Cox, supra note 48, at 1082 n.276; see also Keane, supra note
131, at 520 ("[S]tates which have affirmatively altered their law to benefit lesbians and gay
men-for example, by passing antidiscrimination legislation or repealing their sodomy
laws-will have some difficulty asserting that the state maintains a strong public policy against
homosexuality.").
152. See Note, supra note 143, at 2042.
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the marriage of a same-sex couple formerly domiciled in the state where the
marriage was legally solemnized, because that would be the state which had the
most significant relationship with the couple. Conflict-of-laws doctrine generally
requires that the law of the state with the most significant contacts should apply
in judicial determinations in another state.
Another reason, however, is that the couple's fundamental right to travel,
guaranteed by Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, would be violated by
nonrecognition of the marriage in their destination state. The Constitution
prohibits states from inordinately restricting a person's right to enter or leave a
state, and limits a state's "authority to condition the right to leave on an
individual's agreement to follow its law while in another state."'5 A restriction
would survive judicial scrutiny, however, if the state proved that it was necessary
to prevent harm inside the state. 54 If the marriage were illegal within the state,
the act of an individual leaving the state to perform that illegal act and then
returning could be construed as causing harm to the state.'55 The success of this
constitutional claim, then, rests upon a declaration of the individual's right to
marry as fundamental-thus, constitutionally protected. The state cannot, absent
516
compelling reasons, make illegal an act which is fundamental.'
A third possible constitutional basis in favor of recognition exists in the recent
Supreme Court decision, Romer v. Evans.'57 In Romer, the Court applied rational
basis review to Colorado's Amendment 2, a measure designed to prohibit any
nondiscrimination laws created for the benefit of homosexuals, and struck it
down. The Court found that the state constitutional amendment "raise[d] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected. . . . '[A] bare ... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimategovernmental interest."""8 While
some argue that Romer does not signal that DOMA and counterpart statutes at
the state level are unconstitutional,' 59 the uncharacteristic striking down of a
constitutional amendment under rational basis scrutiny may indicate a turn in the

153. Keane, supra note 131, at 508. "These principles reflect not only a desire to permit
individual mobility, but also a real concern for the visited state's right to regulate the conduct
of visitors within its borders." Id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
157. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
158. Id. at 1628 (omissions and emphasis in original) (quoting Department of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
159. See Defense of Marriage Hearing, supra note 25 (prepared statement of Lynn D.
Wardle) (arguing that DOMA is distinguishable from Colorado's Amendment 2, because
DOMA classifies based on conduct, while the amendment classified based on homosexual
orientation, and because DOMA seeks to protect "the basic unit of our society" while the
amendment would have stripped homosexuals "of potentially all protection of the laws").
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Court's jurisprudence regarding homosexuals. 6 ' It cannot be doubted that
DOMA and the state statutes are intended to deny an identifiable class of the
benefit of laws. True, they only restrict marriage laws and not a large array of
laws as the Colorado amendment contemplated, but the Romer majority seemed
to focus on animosity towards a class as an impermissible, illegitimate state
interest. Though the potential emanations from Romer remain to be seen, it is
quite possible that DOMA and the state statutes are constitutionally invalid under
Romer. 6'
IV. SURVEY OF INDIANA LAW AND POLICY: WILL INDIANA
RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES?

Indiana was one of only a few states which, before the "scare" of Baehr v.
Lewin, had a statute on the books explicitly prohibiting same sex marriage.,' The
existence of this statute is, of course, a huge strike against any recognition of
same-sex marriage. In addition, Indiana has recently joined the flurry of states
attempting to pass legislation to preclude recognition of same-sex marriages
performed legally in other states. On April 25, 1997, the Conference Committee
Report on House EnrolledAct No. 1265 andSenate EnrolledAct No. 8-1997 was
adopted by both the House and Senate,' 63 and the legislation was signed by
Governor Frank O'Bannon on May 13, 1997. The legislation amended the samesex marriage prohibition in Indiana Code § 31-7-1-2 to include the following
language: "A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana
even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized."'" This new
statute does not end the discussion about Indiana's recognition of same-sex

160. See Joslin, supra note 93, at 225 ("The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans,
invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2, delivers a significant blow to the obstacles the Court
erected one decade before in Bowers v. Hardwick.") (case names not italicized in original).
161. See id. at 245-46 (quoting portions of Cass Sunstein's testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary in which Sunstein expressed his belief that DOMA violates the
precepts of Romer, because DOMA was bom of animosity for homosexuals).
162. See IND. CODE § 31-7-1-2 (1996) (repealed 1997). This statute said: "Only a female
may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female." This language was incorporated into IND.
CODE § 31-11-1-1 (1997).
163. The bill passed the House on February 6, 1997, by a vote of 84-8; it passed the Senate
on April 9, 1997, passing 38-10. See Stuart A. Hirsch, Ban on Gay Marriages to Go to
Governor, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 26, 1997, at B1.
164. The legislation began as House Bill 1019, sponsored by Representative Woody Burton.
H.B. 1019, 110th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1997). It was renamed House Bill 1265 (H.B. 1265,
110th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1997)) and was enrolled as House Enrolled Act No. 1265
(H.E.A. 1265, 110th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1997)) and Senate Enrolled Act No. 8-1997
(S.E.A. 8-1997, 110th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1997)). After passage, the legislation was
named Act of May 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 198-1997. The amended statute, Indiana Code § 317-1-2, was repealed, and renamed Indiana Code § 31-11-1-1. See IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1; IND.
CODE § 31-7-1-2 (1996).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 73:355

marriages should they be legalized in Hawaii, but it is indicative of a steep uphill
battle.
The State of Indiana has a relatively small case load concerning void marriages
or even marriages which, though validly performed in other states, violate
Indiana law. However, it is clear that Indiana courts follow the general rule of
marriage validation represented by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. 65 In 1950, in Gunter v. Dealer's TransportationCo., an Indiana appeals
court asserted that "[t]he validity of th[is] marriage, being governed by the law
of the place of its celebration, must be recognized in Indiana as a matter of
comity. ' A year later, the Indiana Supreme Court confirmed this statement of
law: "The validity of a marriage depends upon the law of the place where it
occurs."' 167 Furthermore, Indiana courts have taken seriously the obligation under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give effect to sister state judgments and
decrees. For example, in the context of out-of-state divorces, courts have
enforced the effects of divorces procured in other states despite the differences
between Indiana divorce law and policy and those of the other states. 6 '
There is an exception within the context of the general rule which requires
recognition of marriages validly solemnized in another state. If a state not
wishing to recognize a marriage celebrated in another state has significant
contacts to the marriage and the participants, it may apply its own law, instead
of giving credit to the other state's, so long as it has a strong public policy that
disfavors such recognition.' 69 What does this mean for same-sex marriage
recognition in Indiana? The answer to this question depends first upon
characterization of the plaintiffs. There are three potential plaintiffs who will sue
to enforce their same-sex marriage: first, the plaintiffs may be residents of
Indiana who visited Hawaii to avail themselves of Hawaii's marriage law;
second, the plaintiffs may be residents of Hawaii or some other state at the time

165. See Cox, supra note 48, at 1096 (reporting that Indiana follows the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws).
166. 91 N.E.2d 377, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950) (citing Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53
(1862)).
167. Bolkovac v. State, 98 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ind. 1951).
168. See Irons v. Irons, 180 N.E.2d 105, 106 (Ind. 1962) (overruling wife's petition for
rehearing) ("[I]t is not our province as a reviewing court to consider whether the practice of
obtaining so-called ex parte out of state divorces, by persons who have spent much of their
married life in this state, is good or bad for the litigants or society in general."); Irons v. Irons,
178 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. 1961) ("[T]o permit decrees of sister states to be overturned upon
a small quantum of proof would be to emasculate the constitutional provision requiring each
state to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of every other state."); Scherer v.
Scherer, 405 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("Indiana courts have afforded practical
recognition, and give full faith and credit, to divorce decrees of the courts of sister states which
have acquired the necessary jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties .... ).
169. See D'Amato, supra note 17, at 916 (discussing sections 283(2) and 283(3) of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws); see also supra notes 146-52 and accompanying
text.
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of their marriage, who later move to Indiana; and third, the plaintiffs may be
residents of Hawaii or another state, but who intended to become residents of
Indiana immediately following their nuptials.
First, Indiana still retains the right under conflict-of-laws doctrine to deny
recognition of marriages validly celebrated in another state in which one or both
parties are domiciliaries of Indiana. 71 In this circumstance, Indiana has the most
significant contacts with the marriage and the parties, and in a judicial
proceeding in which the validity of the marriage is at issue, the court would be
free to apply Indiana law, thereby treating the couple as if they were not married
at all. However, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 17 ' and the U.S.
Supreme Court, in construing the obligation under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause 172 require an additional finding before a judgment, act, or decree of a
sister state can be disregarded: a state must prove that recognition of the marriage
violates a strong public policy of the state. Litigants who are domiciliaries of
Indiana who want legal recognition of their marriages must argue against the
public policy that the State of Indiana asserts, but the prospects are not
promising.
Second, it is clear that if the State of Indiana does not have the most significant
contacts to the couple at the time of the marriage, then an Indiana court would
have no basis to deny recognition of the marriage. For example, Indiana would
probably not have the most significant relationship with a couple who was
domiciled in a state other than Indiana at the time of the marriage. Under the
Restatement (Second) rule, even if a state has a strong public policy against the
marriage, if it does not have the most significant relationship with the parties or
the marriage, then it must apply the law of the forum where the marriage was
solemnized. Although it appears that this category of marriages must be
recognized, it still must be determined what effect the recent adoption of Indiana
Code § 31-11-1-1, which declares void marriages between same-sex partners
solemnized elsewhere, will have on the category.
At first glance, the legislation seems to stymie validly married same-sex
couples who wish to move to Indiana and be considered married in the eyes of
the law. The legislation could, however, be challenged and found
unconstitutional, a result which, though possible, 7 1 could take years. Plaintiffs

170. Indiana follows the conflict-of-laws doctrine represented by the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict ofLaws. See Cox, supra note 48, at 1096.
171.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 283(2).

172. See, e.g., Irons, 178 N.E.2d at 161 ("The challenged judgment must, however, satisfy
our scrutiny that the reciprocal duty of respect owed by the States to one another's
adjudications has been fairly discharged .. ") (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 233 (1945)).
173. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (concluding that laws which are based on
animus towards a particular class cannot survive rational-basis scrutiny); see also D'Amato,
supra note 17, at 942 n.212 (explaining that a subsequent move or visit to Indiana would be
protected by the fundamental right to travel).
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who challenge the statute could assert that Indiana Code § 31-11-1-1
discriminates on the basis of gender to the extent that it treats persons who wish
to marry persons of their choosing dissimilarly with others who do the same, but
choose people of the opposite sex. 74 Indiana accords gender-based
classifications intermediate scrutiny.'75 Therefore, although the legislation would
not be scrutinized as carefully as laws which classify based on race or ethnicity,
it would also not be presumptively valid, unlike legislation that is only subject
to rational-basis review. Moreover, the statute was, at least partially, motivated
out of animus for an unpopular class of citizens.' 76 Animus is not a legitimate
governmental reason, even under deferential rational-basis scrutiny.'77 While we
have yet to see how Romer will be construed in the context of same-sex
marriages, the Supreme Court has made clear that legislation is impermissible if
it limits the extent to which a class may appeal to the political process for relief.
In the third case, if the plaintiffs are a validly married same-sex couple, both
nonresidents, who intended to move to Indiana right after the marriage, Indiana
would have the most significant relationship to the marriage and a court could
choose to apply Indiana law. A couple who intended to move to Indiana right
after their marriage could not validly argue that Indiana law should not be
applied. Moreover, Indiana Code § 31-11-1-1, if valid, would be effective against
the couple's claim.
A. Indiana'sStrong Public Policy
The second category of plaintiffs is made up those who contract valid same-sex
marriages, but are residents of a state other than Indiana at the time of marriage,
who later move to Indiana. Presuming that Indiana Code § 31-11-1-1 is
unconstitutional and therefore not a bar, in order for these plaintiffs to succeed
in gaining legal recognition of their marriages, they must prove that Indiana does
not have a strong public policy against same-sex marriages. First, though for
purposes of this discussion it is presumed that Indiana Code § 31-11-1-1 is
unconstitutional, the fact that the Indiana legislature specifically proscribed
same-sex marriage and the recognition of same-sex marriages solemnized
elsewhere may still be powerful evidence of public opinion.' 78 If this statute
never existed, litigants defending their same-sex marriages could argue that the

174. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miike, Civil No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
175. See Hines v. Caston Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); see also
IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.
176. Indiana Senator Richard Bray, R-Martinsville, was quoted before the bill passed as
saying: "The state has the right to refuse to recognize behavior that is socially and morally
obnoxious to its residents." Alex Ihnen & Christy McKay, Indiana Might Ban Same-Sex
Marriages,IND. DAILY STUDENT, Feb. 12, 1997, at 1.
177. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620.
178. See IND. CODE § 3 1-7-1-2 (1996) (repealed 1997).
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other statutes regulating marriage "only implicitly prohibit homosexual
marriages, [and] indicate nothing more than a legislative determination that only
heterosexual relationships should be encouraged by the conferral of marriage
benefits.""7 9 Without the express prohibition, the laws are less determinative of
a strong public policy.
Another source of strong public policy against same-sex marriage recognition
could be found in Indiana's marriage evasion statute." ° This statute declares void
marriages obtained in other states by Indiana residents in order to evade two
listed statutes. One of the enumerated statutes will not allow a circuit court clerk
to issue a marriage license to a person adjudged to be mentally incompetent, or
to a person appearing to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.' If a person
goes to another state to avoid this law, he or she has violated Indiana's evasion
statute. The other statute lists the requirements of the application for a marriage
license; section 31-7-3-3(a)(7) of this statute requires that an application contain
"[a] statement of facts necessary to determine whether any legal impediment to
the proposed marriage exists."'82 If Indiana Code § 31-11-1-1 is unconstitutional,
then it cannot qualify as a legal impediment, and the marriage evasion statute
would not be effective against our nonresident couple.
Additionally, although Indiana does not have a marriage validation statute,
Indiana case law expresses ajudicial lean towards marriage validation.' Finally,
courts considering whether to recognize a same-sex marriage may take into
account morality and public sentiment. Of course, an accurate picture of the
public attitude is very difficult to obtain, especially on such a contentious
issue. ' 4 It is likely that national polls would be used, and a judge's personal bias
could come into play.
B. Counterargumentsto the State's Strong PublicPolicy
Again presuming that Indiana Code § 31-11-1-1 is found unconstitutional,
litigants seeking recognition of their same-sex marriages still must assert that the
law of the state in which their marriage was solemnized should govern.
Assuming that Indiana has the most significant relationship with the marriages,
litigants must argue that Indiana does not have a strong public policy disfavoring
recognition. In order to accomplish this, litigants could point out that there are
public policy reasons in support of their marriages. First, the litigants could point
out that courts have recognized other types of invalid marriages in the past or

179. Hovermill, supra note 147, at 488 ("The statutes containing express prohibitions are
similar to those that courts in the past have determined to demonstrate a strong public policy
180. See IND. CODE § 31-7-6-6.
181. See id§ 31-7-3-10.

182. Id. § 31-7-3-3(a)(7).
183. See supranotes 165-68 and accompanying text.
184. See Hovermill, supranote 147, at 491.
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created presumptions in favor of their validity.'85 For example, bigamous
marriages have been prohibited by law in Indiana, yet courts have allowed
second marriages solemnized outside of Indiana a presumption of validity
pending the assailant's proof of invalidity.'86 Courts have also presumed the
validity of the second marriage where a spouse to the first marriage simply had
not heard from or about his or her first spouse for six years.'87 In the case of
Gunter v. Dealer's TransportationCo., ' the court derived from the facts that
though the couple's marriage was void because the husband was not validly
divorced at the time it was procured, the couple had lived for a time in a state that
recognized common law marriage, and hence the wife would be considered the
husband's common law wife (and was thereby entitled to his workmen's
compensation upon his death)." 9 The court so held even though Indiana does not
recognize common law marriages.
In addition, Indiana courts have allowed the finding of a common law marriage
where the parties' actual marriage was void by reason of one party's insanity at
the time of marriage. 9 ' In another example, the court held a marriage valid
despite the fact that the underage wife had evaded Indiana law requiring parental
consent to the marriage. 9' Similarly, an Indiana court refused to recognize a
consanguineous marriage validly performed in another country, thereby denying
one party a divorce; the court nonetheless declared that the couple's children
were legitimate, and that equity compelled an award of marital property be paid
192
to the "wife.'
As these cases demonstrate, despite the public policy represented in the
Indiana marriage laws, courts have used their discretion either to recognize
marriages as valid or to issue equitable remedies. In the spirit of the oft-cited
case, Teter v. Teter, 93 courts have been guided by the rule that "'[t]he law
presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage;

185. Because there are no Indiana cases dealing with same-sex marriage, we can look to the
judicial treatment of other types of marriages validly solemnized in states other than Indiana
for analogy. Admittedly, cases involving the validity of marriages solemnized outside of
Indiana are quite old and at times present tenuous analogy. There simply is not much in the way
of marriage recognition cases, and no recent cases.
186. See, e.g., Rainier v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) ("Indiana was
an early subscriber to the view that one of the strongest presumptions of law is that a marriage,
once shown, is valid.").
187. See Cooper v. Cooper, 86 Ind. 75 (1882).
188. 91 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950).
189. See id.
190. See Wiley v. Wiley, 123 N.E. 252, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1919).
191. See Christlieb v. Christlieb, 125 N.E. 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1919).
192. See Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 41 N.E.2d 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942).
193. 88 Ind. 494 (1883).

1997]

THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE

legitimacy, and not bastardy.""94 Litigants must present to courts that Indiana
common law as represented in marriage cases favors marriage validation,
stability, and legitimacy of children. If a same-sex couple, domiciled and validly
married in Hawaii, later moves to Indiana, legal recognition of their marriage will
be vital to their married existence. Past cases underline the importance of
marriage recognition, even though the marriages could not have been solemnized
in Indiana. Furthermore, litigants could argue that recognition of same-sex
marriage actually promotes family stability and monogamy.!9" These attributes
of traditional marriage are readily transferred to same-sex marriage, and benefit
society in the same manner.
Litigants could also argue the principles of deference and mutual respect
attendant to other states' decrees. One commentator claims that"[e]ach state has
an interest in ensuring that marital relationships entered into under its auspices
are respected by other states. In order to preserve multistate relationships and
ensure reciprocal treatment, states must sometimes defer to the law of another
state."' 9 6 Advocates could note as well that Indiana repealed its law making
consensual sodomy a crime in 1977.' Though there is a difference between
respecting personal privacy and overt governmental approval or acceptance,
which would be the case with state issuance of marriage licenses to homosexuals,
it is commonly understood that partners to a marriage are sexually active. That
Indiana allows sexual intimacy between homosexual men but does not allow
them to marry is inconsistent with this common expectation. Moreover, the
repeal of this law could be construed as reformation of public intolerance for
homosexual men in particular, or at least acceptance of freedom of
decisionmaking in the realms of personal privacy and intimacy in general. This
legislative change is evidence of the absence of a strong public policy against
same-sex marriage. Therefore, an Indiana court faced with the choice-of-law
question should choose the law of the state where the marriage was solemnized,
thereby recognizing the marriage.

194. Id at 498 (alteration and emphasis added) (quoting Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 451,
459 (1883)); see also Langdon v. Langdon, 183 N.E. 400,403 (Ind.1932) ("'Every intendment
of the law is in favor of matrimony. When marriage has been shown in evidence, whether
regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proof, the law raises a strong presumption
of its legality.... ."' (omission added) (quoting I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE § 457 (6th ed. 1881))), overruled on other grounds by
Azimow v. Azimow, 255 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970).
195. See Hovermill, supra note 147, at 455 ("A choice of law rule that validates out-of-state
marriages provides stability and predictability in questions of marriage, ensures the
legitimization of children, protects party expectations, and promotes interstate comity.").
196. Note, supra note 143, at 2042.
197. See IND. CODE § 35-1-89-1 (1976) (repealed 1977).
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V. CONCLUSION

The question remains whether the American people, much less the citizens of
Indiana, are ready for gay and lesbian marriage. Even in Hawaii the legislature
recently passed a constitutional amendment which, if adopted by the state's
voters, would allow the legislature to reserve marriage for male-female
couples.' 98 This measure illustrates an attempt by the Hawaii legislature to
reverse the path of the Hawaii courts.'9 9 And it is not likely that the Supreme
Court would put a stop to a mad rush to deny recognition by democratic process,
despite the possible grounds for constitutional violations. As Cass Sunstein, a
frequent commentator on homosexual legal issues, asserted:
[T]here is reason for great caution on the part of the courts. An immediate
judicial vindication of the principle could well jeopardize important interests.
It could galvanize opposition. It could weaken the anti-discrimination
movement itself. It could provoke more hostility and even violence against
gays and lesbians. It could jeopardize the authority of the judiciary. It could
well produce calls20 0for a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme
Court's decision.

Though backlash is evident in Hawaii and many other states, also evident are
coterminous ameliorative measures: the same day that the Hawaii legislature
passed the constitutional amendment, it passed a bill that would give same-sex
couples many of the benefits married couples enjoy.2"' Two months later, on July
8, 1997, the bill was signed into law by Hawaii's governor. Hawaii presently
offers an extremely comprehensive benefits package to partners not legally able
to marry. 2 2 Admittedly, the legislators passed this measure in an effort to stave
off the need for same-sex marriage. Still, the law represents a victory for gays
and lesbians, however conservative.
We cannot forget how contentious an issue interracial marriage was, or how
explosive school desegregation was, or that adding discrimination based on sex
to Title VII was a joke intended to thwart the bill's passage. If the ban on same-

198. See Susan Essoyan, HawaiiApproves Benefits Packagefor Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES,

Apr. 30, 1997, at A3. Moreover, polls indicate that as many as 70% of Hawaiians oppose the
legalization of same-sex marriage. See Meki Cox, HawaiiSet to Extend Gay Rights; PairsGet
Benefits, Not Right to Marry, ARiz. REPUBLIC, July 6, 1997, at A10.
199. See Hawaii House Adopts Amendment to Ban Same-Sex Marriages, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4853054. The vote will occur in November of

1998. Dan Foley, attorney for plaintiffs in Baehrv. Lewin and Baehr v. Miike, questioned the
form of the amendment and said it was rushed through the House. See id.
200. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 25.
201. See Boxall, supra note 102, at A3. The legislation gives partners who are not legally
able to marry each other over 60 benefits, including family medical insurance, auto insurance
eligibility, inheritance rights, victims' rights, joint property rights, the ability to sue for
wrongful death, and the ability to issue a domestic violence complaint, among others. See id.
202. See id.
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sex marriage violates the Constitution, we do a disservice to our citizens to deny
a class of people the benefits of marriage. We live in a society governed by laws
that incorporate a plethora of moral, cultural, and normative values. The issue of
same-sex marriage, more than most issues, causes us to inspect the bases for our
laws and to determine whether they are legitimate, appropriate, or fair. Once a
state has legalized same-sex marriage, the strength of the bans remaining in other
states and the new antirecognition statutes will have to be tested.

